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THE UPTICK RULE OF SHORT SALE REGULATION: CAN IT
ALLEVIATE DOWNWARD PRICE PRESSURE FROM NEGATIVE
EARNINGS SHOCKS?
Lynn Bai*
This papor ompirically oxaminos tho offoct of tho uptick rulo (including tho
bid tost applicablo to NASDAQ stocks) of short salo rogulations on stock
pricos and short solling activitios immodiatoly aftor nogativo oarnings
surprisos that occurrod during tho poriod of May to Novombor 2005. It
comparos prico paths and short solling activitios of stocks rostrictod by tho
uptick rulo with stocks that woro oxomptod from tho rulo as a rosult of tho
SEC's Pilot Program. Tho study has not found any ovidonco that pricos of
stocks subjoct to tho rulo doclinod at a slowor spood than pricos of oxomptod
stocks at timos of stross. Tho two groups of stocks had similar lovols of
short salo volumos dospito tho rulo's prohibition on short solling at minus
or zoro-minus ticks. For NYSE and AMEX stocks, this study shows that
markot short ordors whoso immodiato oxocutions woro barrod by tho uptick
rulo found oxocution opportunitios against tho upcoming buy ordors within
15 minutos aftor thoir convorsion into limit ordors at tho logally shortablo
prico. For NASDAQ stocks, this study shows that up bids occurrod with
high froquoncy aftor nogativo oarnings surprisos and jointly with prico
improvomonts thoy offorod gonorous oxocution opportunitios to short salo
ordors. This study londs support to tho SEC's rocont susponsion of tho rulo
in absonco of sovoro markot conditions.
SECTION 1. INTRODUCTION
This paper empirically examines the effect of the uptick rule
(including the bid test applicable to NASDAQ stocks) of short sale
regulations on stock prices and short selling activities immediately
after negative earnings surprises that occurred during the period of
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School of Business. The author thanks Michael Brandt of Duke University Fuqua
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May to November 2005. A short sale is a sale of a security that the
seller does not own or any sale that is consummated by the delivery
of a security borrowed by the seller. Up until as recent as July 3,
2007, the Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") had Rule
10a-1 1 under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,2 which provided
that a listed security might be sold short, either at a price above the
price at which the immediately preceding sale was effected (plus
tick), or at the last sale price if it was higher than the last different
price (zero-plus tick). Short sales were not permitted on minus ticks
or zero-minus ticks, subject to narrow exceptions. 3 Rule lOa-1 was
first adopted in 19384 for the purpose of, among others, "preventing
short sellers from accelerating a declining market by exhausting all
remaining bids at one price level, causing successively lower prices to
be established by long sellers."5 Rule lOa-1 applied only to securities
listed on the New York Stock Exchange and the American Stock
Exchange and did not apply to short sales of NASDAQ securities.
Short sales in NASDAQ stocks were subject to NASDAQ Rule 3350,
which was similar in spirit to Rule lOa-1 and prohibited short sales
1 17 C.F.R. § 240. 10a-1 (2007). This rule has been removed by the SEC Final
Rule that was issued on July 3, 2007. 72 F.R. 36348-01 (July 3, 2007).
2 15 U.S.C. § 78a et seq. (2006).
3 See 17 C.F.R. § 240 (2007). Rule 10a-l(e) listed numerous exemptions from the
uptick rule, which included, among others, the odd-lot dealer exemption, the
exemption that allowed a specialist or market maker to execute a short sale for its
own account at a zero-minus, the exemption that allowed market makers to execute
transactions at their offer following a trade-through, and the exemption for bona
fide arbitrage activities.
4 See Regulation SHO and Rule 10a-1, Exchange Act Release No. 34-55970
(June 28, 2007), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/2007/34-55970.pdf
[hereinafter Regulation SHO Release].
F See Short Sales, Exchange Act Release No. 34-42037 (Oct. 20, 1999) [hereinafter
SEC Release]. The other two purposes of the uptick rule are: (i) allowing relatively
unrestricted short selling in an advancing market, and (ii) preventing short selling at
successively lower prices, thus eliminating short selling as a tool for driving the
market down.
[VOL. 5:1
HeinOnline -- 5 Rutgers Bus. L.J.  4 2008
2008] UPTICKRULE OF SHORTSALE PRICE REGULATION 5
in NASDAQ National Market (NNM) securities at, or below, the best
bid when the best bid displayed was below the preceding best bid.6
The core provisions of Rule lOa-1 remained virtually
unchanged since its adoption, but the U.S. financial market went
through fundamental changes including, for example, real-time
surveillance, pricing decimalization, and reduction in spread and
minimum tick moves. Requests for exemptive relief increased
dramatically in the past decade and prompted the SEC to reconsider
the plausibility of continued application of the rule in the current
market framework. In an effort to gather data and create a controlled
environment for a thorough study on the effect of the rule on market
prices, volatility, liquidity and trading activities, the SEC
implemented a Pilot Program from May 2, 2005 to July 3, 2007,
whereby the uptick rule was suspended on one-third of Russell 3000
Index constituent stocks with high levels of liquidity. The SEC
requested public opinion on a number of specific questions regarding
the effects of the uptick rule, including: "Does Rule lOa-1 continue to
serve a valid purpose in a declining market by preventing short
sellers from accelerating declines in securities prices, or 'depressing'
the market?" 7 The price-supporting hypothesis was one of the main
reasons for the rule's initial adoption and was invoked by some
market participants when the SEC was considering abandoning the
rule on a number of occasions in the past. 8 A verification of this
6 NASDAQ Rule 3350 exempted registered NASDAQ market makers in
connection with bona fide market making activities and options and warrants market
makers for hedging activities. NASDAQ Rule 3350 replaced NASD Rule 3350 when
NASDAQ became a stock exchange on August 1, 2006. The bid test applicable to
short selling was identical under both rules. NASDAQ, Inc., NASDAQ Manual
Online, available at http://www.complinet.com/nasdaq/display/display.html?rbid=1705
(last visited Aug. 1, 2006). The sample period of this paper was prior to August 1,
2006. Thus, the term NASD Rule 3350 is used when referring to the bid test
applicable to NASDAQ securities. Moreover, Rule 10a-1 and NASD Rule 3350 are
used collectively as the "uptick rule" in this paper unless the context requires a
distinction of one from the other.
7 See SEC Release, supra note 5, at 16.
8 In 1976, the SEC ordered a public investigation of the feasibility and effects of
certain proposed changes in the short sale regulation including a suspension of the
HeinOnline -- 5 Rutgers Bus. L.J.  5 2008
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hypothesis would carry a substantial weight in the SEC's
consideration of whether the rule should be abolished.
During the course of the Pilot Program, the SEC received
comments from a long list of institutions and individuals, as well as
four completed outside studies (in addition to SEC's own empirical
study carried out by the SEC's Office of Economic Analysis) that
utilized the pilot data in examining various aspects of the uptick
rule.9 The study, which this paper records, was the only one among
those four studies to focus on the price supporting hypothesis. The
results suggested that the uptick rule had no impact on the
magnitude and speed of price decline at times when stocks were
subject to downward pressure caused by unfavorable earning shocks,
offering the SEC one additional piece of evidence on the
ineffectiveness of this rule in the current market framework. Finally,
on July 3, 2007, the SEC abolished Rule lOa-1 and any rule of
exchanges (including NASDAQ 3350) that applied a price test or bid
test on short sale orders. 10 The SEC cited the results of this study
and other studies completed during the Pilot Program as evidence
supporting its decision.1 1
In analyzing the intraday price effect of the uptick rule, this
study took the following approach. First, negative earnings surprises
were identified for pilot and nonpilot stocks during the period from
May 2, 2005 to November 30, 2005 (within the Pilot Program period).
This period provided events of two or three earnings reports for most
uptick rule. The SEC received 12 comment letters in response to the 1976
proposals. Eight commenters, including the NYSE and AMEX, strongly opposed
any suspension of the uptick rule for the reason that the suspension would have
damaging effects, such as accelerating price declines and increasing volatility. See
id. at 6. In 1980, the SEC withdrew the proposals, principally due to public
comments opposing the elimination of the uptick rule on short selling. In 1991, the
House Committee on Government Operations released a report on short selling,
which made numerous findings and recommendations, including that the uptick
rule acted as a price stabilizing force and should be retained. See H.R. REP. No.
102-414 (1991).
9 See Regulation SHO Release, supra note 4, at 8 n. 20.
10 Id. at 1-2.
11 Id at 21 n.71.
[VOL. 5:1
HeinOnline -- 5 Rutgers Bus. L.J.  6 2008
2008] UPTICKRULE OF SHORTSALE PRICE REGULATION 7
of the stocks included in the study. Negative earning surprises were
identified by comparing the actual quarterly earnings per share with
the consensus analyst forecast. Negative earnings surprises are
considered a major cause of stress in stock prices, and thus provide
good opportunities to study the price effect of the uptick rule. It was
shown, via the Wilcoxon Rank Sum test, that the sample earnings
surprises were comparable to those typically seen in the past three
years, and that the sample events exhibited signs of stress such as
lower returns and higher short sale volumes compared to days before
earnings announcements.
Next, the study examined if there was any difference in
overnight price adjustments between pilot and nonpilot stocks from
market close that occurred prior to earnings announcement to
market open immediately after earnings announcement. A regression
of the overnight return on the pilot dummy and other variables
revealed no difference in the overnight return between pilot and
nonpilot stocks. Then, the study compared the intraday returns of
pilot and nonpilot stocks and the speed of their respective price
declines during different time periods on the first trading day after
earnings announcements (the "Event Day"). There was no evidence
of any price supporting effect of the uptick rule.
Since the common belief was that the uptick rule could support
prices by limiting short volumes, the lack of difference in the
intraday returns of pilot and nonpilot stocks prompted a further
study on whether short sale volumes differed between these two
groups of stocks. The comparison of short volumes at market open
and during regular trading hours on the Event Day revealed that for
NYSE and AMEX stocks, short sale volumes of pilot stocks were
higher than those of nonpilot stocks at market open but not during
regular trading hours. For NASDAQ stocks, short sale volumes of
pilot stocks were lower than those of nonpilot stocks at market open,
but there was no difference between the two groups of stocks during
regular trading hours.
To identify the sources of execution opportunities that
"neutralized" the intended restrictive effect of the uptick rule, this
study analyzed short volumes at different relations among the
minimum shortable price (the "MSP", i.e., the lowest price without
HeinOnline -- 5 Rutgers Bus. L.J.  7 2008
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violating the uptick rule), the execution price, and the prevailing
quotes. For NYSE and AMEX stocks, the uptick rule was preventing
immediate executions for most of the times but market short sale
orders were able to be matched with buy orders soon after their
conversion into limit orders at the MSP. This meant that at a stress
level generated by negative earnings shocks of magnitudes typical in
recent history, there was still sufficient buy interest in the market,
which, aided by enhanced execution priorities due to shortened
execution lines under the 1 cent minimum tick rule, offered ample
execution opportunities to short sale orders. The uptick rule achieved
at most a delay in the execution of those orders that was less than 15
minutes. For NASDAQ stocks, the bid test was not binding for a
majority of the times and, together with price improvements,
provided generous execution opportunities to short sales. This meant
that movements in best quotes did not coincide with movements in
prices during short time intervals. Quotes bounced back and forth
rather than declining consecutively during short time intervals,
rendering the bid test inapplicable most of the times on a stressful
day despite the occurrence of consecutive declines in prices. In
addition, there was evidence of price improvements to allow the
immediate executions of short orders that were otherwise barred by
the uptick rule. In sum, the uptick rule was ineffective in reducing
short sale volumes and supporting prices when the market was
experiencing stress triggered by earnings shocks.
The rest of this paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 reviews
literature on short sale constraints; Section 3 discusses the SEC Pilot
Program in detail; Section 4 describes the data and compares
characteristics of pilot and nonpilot stocks in the sample; Section 5
compares overnight and intraday price movements of pilot and
nonpilot stocks; Section 6 compares short sale volumes of the two
groups of stocks and provides explanations to the lack of
restrictiveness of the uptick rule; and Section 7 concludes this paper.
SECTION 2. LITERATURE REVIEW
There are two major components to short sale regulations: the
requirement of stock borrowing before short sales and the uptick
[VOL. 5:1
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rule. Thus far, there has not been any literature published in law
reviews or any other law journals that empirically examines the
effect of the uptick rule. Studies carried out by finance academics
have focused on the price effect of the stock borrowing requirement,
rather than the price effect of the uptick rule. These papers examine
the relation between market-to-book ratio and subsequent returns
over a period of time, or the relation between institutional ownership
of stocks, which is a proxy for the difficulty in stock borrowing, and
subsequent returns. They reached different conclusions as to whether
short sale regulations in general, or the inability to borrow stocks in
particular, have caused overpricing. Representative papers include
those authored by Miller, 12 Diamond, & Verrecchia, 13 and Jones &
Lamont. 14 While there have been a number of papers, represented
by Bris, Goetzmann, & Zhu, 15 and Charoenrook & Daouk, 16 which
study whether short sale regulations have the effect of reducing the
severity of market panic, their approach was to compare the
skewness in daily stock return distributions across jurisdictions that
have different degrees of short sale restrictions, without singling out
the effect of the uptick rule price test from the stock borrowing
requirement. They found no evidence that short sale regulations have
reduced the severity of market panic.
12 Edward M. Miller, Risk, Uncertainty, and Divergence of Opinion, 32 J. FIN.
1151, 1151-1168 (1977). This paper establishes a theory that short-sale constrained
securities become overpriced when investors disagree about their values.
13 Douglas W. Diamond & Robert E. Verrecchia, Constraints on Short-Selling
and Asset Price Adjustment to Private Information, 18 J. FIN. ECON. 277, 277-311
(1987). This paper finds that short sale constraints cause overpricing.
14 Charles M. Jones & Owen A. Lamont, Short-Sale Constraints and Stock
Returns, 66 J. FIN. ECON. 207, 207-239 (2002). This paper empirically shows that
stocks that are costly to borrow have a higher market-to-book ratio and low
subsequent returns, consistent with the overpricing hypothesis.
15 Arturo Bris et al, Efficiency and the Bear Short Sales and Markets around
the World, Working Paper No. 9466, NAT'L BUREAU OF ECON. RESEARCH, 1-30
(2003).
16 Anchada Charoenrook & Hazem Daouk, Market- Wide Short-Selling
Restrictions (Aug. 2005) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Owen Graduate
Sch. of Mgmt., Vanderbilt University).
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This paper extends the above lines of literature in two
directions. Firstly, it focuses on the price effect of the uptick rule,
rather than the price effect of the stock borrowing requirement or the
joint effect of these two components of short sale regulations.
Secondly, it compares the intraday price path of restricted and
unrestricted stocks in studying whether the uptick rule reduces the
severity of downward pressure on prices. This is a more direct
approach to studying this question than analyzing the skewness in
daily return distributions. The SEC's Pilot Program offered a window
of opportunity which made this comparison feasible.
Concurrent with this study and also utilizing the pilot data,
Diether, Lee, & Werner (2006)17 have studied the effect of the uptick
rule on various market quality measures such as the spread,
volatility, and short sale volume by comparing these measures before
and after the start of the Pilot Program. Alexander and Peterson
(2006) have compared paired pilot and nonpilot stocks around both
the announcement and initiation date of the pilot program in terms
of short sales volume, price volatility, and different measures of
market efficiency.18 However, none of these papers have focused on
the price effect of the uptick rule at times of market stress.
SECTION 3. SEC's PILOT PROGRAM
On May 2, 2005, the SEC started a Pilot Program whereby
one-third of the Russell 3000 index constituent stocks were exempted
17 The study has found that for NYSE stocks, the suspension of the uptick rule
has increased the spreads, but only for stocks with high short-sale activities, and
for NASDAQ stocks, the suspension of the bid test is not associated with any
significant change in the spread. In addition, the study has found no evidence to
suggest that pilot NYSE and NASDAQ stocks experienced more down-side
volatility after the suspension of the uptick rule. The uptick rule has resulted in
more ask-side depth and more orders executed above the mid-quote, and this
phenomenon is more evident for NYSE stocks than for NASDAQ stocks. See id.
18 Gordon J. Alexander and Mark A. Peterson, The Effects of Price Tests on
Market Behavior and Market Quality: An Analysis of Reg. SHO, 11 J. FIN.
MARKETS 1, 84-111 (2008). The study has found no difference between pilot and
nonpilot stocks in these aspects.
[VOL. 5:1
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from the uptick rule initially for a period of one year until April 28,
2006, and subsequently extended up to July 3, 2007. The purpose of
the Pilot Program was for the SEC to collect data to study the effect
of the uptick rule on stock prices, volatility, liquidity, and trading
behavior. The SEC concluded the Pilot Program with a rule, effective
on July 3, 2007, abolishing the uptick rule price test and the bid test
in NASDAQ Rule 3350.19
There were three categories of pilot stocks: Category A
securities were never subject to the uptick rule; Category B securities
were not subject to the rule from 4:15 p.m. EST until the open of the
consolidated tape the next day (4:00a.m.). All other securities were
included in Category C and were not subject to the rule from the
close of the consolidated tape (8:00p.m. EST) until the open of the
consolidated tape the next day. Category A pilot stocks were the
subject of this study and are referred to as the "pilot stocks"
throughout this paper.
The Russell 3000 index consists of 3000 US stocks with the
largest market capitalization and is reconstructed annually to ensure
that new and growing equities are reflected. According to the SEC
Pilot Order 2° that established the Pilot Program, in selecting pilot
stocks, the SEC first excluded thirty two stocks that were not
NASDAQ securities, listed on NYSE, or listed on the American Stock
Exchange because short sales in those securities were not subject to
the uptick rule anyway. Next, the SEC excluded stocks whose initial
public offerings or spin-offs commenced after April 30, 2004. After
the above exclusions, the SEC sorted the remaining stocks into three
groups according to their listing exchanges: AMEX, NASDAQ NNM,
and NYSE, and then ranked the securities in each group by the
average daily dollar volume over a one year period from June 25,
2003 through June 25, 2004. In each group, the SEC then selected
every third stock from the remaining stocks, starting from the second
stock on the list.
19 Regulation SHO Release, supra note 4.
20 Order Suspending the Operation of Short Sale Price Provisions for Designated
Securities and Time Periods, Exchange Act Release No. 50104 (July 28, 2004),
available at http://www.see.gov/rules/other/34-50104.htm#P21_433.
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The names of the stocks included in the pilot program were
announced on June 25, 2004 in the Pilot Order. Stocks designated as
pilot stocks remained so except in limited circumstances, such as a
delisting of a security from an exchange and its trading as an OTCBB
security. Name changes of securities included in the pilot list did not
affect their status. If a security included in the pilot changed its
name and ticker symbol, the security would remain in the pilot but
would be identified by its new name and ticker symbol. Mergers and
other business combinations involving securities included in the pilot
program might affect their status. For example, if a Category A pilot
security merged with another Category A pilot security, then the
security resulting from the transaction would be a Category A pilot
security. However, if a Category A pilot security merged with a
Category B pilot security or a Category C pilot security, then the
status of the security resulting from the transaction would depend on
the market capitalization of the companies involved in the
transaction. The company with the larger market capitalization,
based on the most recent share number and price information as of
the close of trading on the day before the transaction was announced,
would have the pilot status of its securities applied to the security
resulting from the transaction.
During the period of the Pilot Program, each exchange
provided a daily update of the lists of Category A pilot securities and
Category B pilot securities for which they maintained the primary
listing. In the instant study, only pilot and nonpilot stocks that
remained on the pilot and nonpilot list from May 2, 2005 to
November 30, 2005 were included in the sample.
SECTION 4. DATA SAMPLE AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS ON PILOT AND
NONPILOT STOCKS
The basic approach of this study was to identify events of
negative earnings surprises and compare the overnight and intraday
price behaviors and short selling activities of pilot and nonpilot
stocks on the Event Day. The sample selection process started with a
list of 900 pilot stocks and 2000 nonpilot stocks that maintained their
pilot or nonpilot status from May 2, 2005 to November 30, 2005. For
[VOL. 5:1
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each stock, the consensus (median) analyst forecast and the actual
Earnings Per Share ("EPS") were obtained from Institutional
Brokers' Estimate System ("IBES") during the sample period.
Negative earnings surprises were defined as events in which the
actual EPS was lower than the consensus analyst forecast. There
were about 1,500 such events after excluding commercial banks and
Real Estate Investment Trusts ("REITs") from the sample. Earnings
announcement times were collected from news wires reporting the
events. Two hundred events in which earnings were announced
during regular trading hours or for which the exact announcement
times could not be ascertained were excluded from the sample. Since
there was a gap of seventeen or eighteen days between the last
calculation day of analyst forecasts and the actual earnings release,
it was possible that new and positive information on earnings was
brought to the market during this period but not recorded in the
database used in the study. To reduce the possibility of
misclassification of positive earnings surprises as negative earnings
surprises, the sample events was further restricted to those which
caused a nonpositive first response in price movements, i.e., events
with negative overnight returns.
Information on shares outstanding for sample stocks as of the
end of 2004 and book values as of the end of April 2005 were obtained
from COMPUSTAT. Market-to-book ratio and market capitalization
for each sample stock were calculated by using the close prices on the
day immediately before the Event Day. Outliers and stocks for which
data were unreported in the database were further excluded from the
sample. After all criteria were applied, there were 945 events
remaining in the sample.
Table 1 Panel A shows the exchange listing of sample stocks.
The number of pilot stocks that remained in the sample was about
49% of that of nonpilot stocks, roughly in line with the SEC's
pilot/nonpilot ratio of 50%. The weights of NYSE, NASDAQ, and
AMEX stocks in the sample were also in line with the SEC's original
design in the Pilot Order. About 17% and 18% of pilot and nonpilot
stocks had multiple appearances in the sample.
HeinOnline -- 5 Rutgers Bus. L.J.  13 2008
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Table I Charactelifics of Sainple Stocks
Panel A Composition of Sample Stocks by Listing Exchanges
Total Number NYSE % iff % ANEX %
Exchange Listirg
- Pilot 311 164 52.7% 141 45.3% 6 1.9%




Table 1 Panel B compares pilot and nonpilot stocks in terms of
market capitahzation, 21 trading volume, 22 options trading volume,
market-to-book ratio, 23 and earnings surprise levels. Options trading
volume was calculated for each sample stock by taking an average of
its daily combined number of call and put options traded during April
2005. Pilot stocks had higher market capitalizations and trading
volumes but lower options trading volumes. About 30% of both pilot
and nonpilot stocks had no options trading, which was consistent
with the SEC's initial design of the Pilot Program. Pilot and nonpilot
stocks had comparable market-to-book ratios and earnings surprise
levels. Pilot stocks had a slightly bigger time gap between IBES' last
calculation of median analyst forecast and the actual earnings
release, but this difference should be inconsequential because sample
events had been filtered by including only events that had both
negative earnings surprises as well as negative first responses in
price movements, i.e., negative overnight returns.
21 Market capitalization was calculated by multiplying shares outstanding as of
the end of 2004 by the close price on the trading day before the Event Day.
22 Trading volume was the average daily dollar trading volume during December
of 2004.
23 Market-to-book ratio was calculated as the close price on the trading day
before the Event Day divided by the book value as of April 30, 2005.
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Table 1 Charateisfiss of Sanple Stocks
Panel B Companson of Plot and Nonpilot Stocks
# Obsenaton Mean Median Maximum Minimum Stde
Market Cap. $inl.)
Pilot 311 $3,861 $264 $198,192 $36 $15,170
-Nonpilot 634 $3,002 $713 $175,391 $37 $10,122
Market-to-Book Ratio
Pilot 311 2.89 2.18 6864 0.48 4.44
-Nonplot 634 3.31 2.1 6373 0.25 5.01
Trade Volume ($ml)
Plot 311 $25,826 $6,373 $556,083 $117 $51,089
Nonplot 634 $13,477 $5,144 $504,547 $157 $41,433
Options Volume (# contracts)
- Pilot 311 1,486 108 53,771 0 5,277





-Plot 311 -0.007 -0.002 0 -0.44 0.03
- Nonpilot 634 -0.005 -0.002 0 -0.33 0.02
Time between Eanings Forecast and Release
Pilot 311 17 18 54 0 9
-Nonpilot 634 16 14 55 0 9
Table 1 Panel C compares the sample stocks' average negative
earnings surprises with those of Russell 3000 stocks in the previous
three years (January 2002 to April 2005), the daily returns24 and
short sale volumes (scaled by shares outstanding) of the sample
stocks on the Event Day with those on Nonevent (historical) days,
which were defined as the two-week period starting from three weeks
before earnings announcements.
24 "Daily Return" was calculated as ln(Pt,iose) - ln(Pt,open), where Pt,dose and Pt,open
were the stock's close and open prices on the Event Day.
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Table 1 Chiactenisfics of Sample Stocks
Panel C Comparison of Sample and Historical Earnings Surprises, Event Day
Returns, and Event Day Short Sale Volumes
Surprise Daily Return ShortVolmlShares Outstdg
Mean
- History -0.01 -0.001 0.002
- Sample Event -0.01 -0.01 0.01
Median
- History -0.002 -0.001 0.001
- Sample Event -0.002 -0.01 0.004
Maximum
-History 0 0.12 0.01
- Sample Event 0 0.21 0.07
Minmm
- History -0.45 -0.12 0
- Sample Event -0.44 -0.39 0
Stdev
- History 0.03 0.02 0.002
- Sample Event 0.02 0.06 0.01
Skewness
-History -8.7 -0.15 2.16
- Sample Event -14.76 -1.00 3.59
Wilcoxon Rank Sum Test
- Z statistics 1.13 -6.69 7.08
- One-sidedp value 0.13 <0.0001 <0.0001
Daily returns as well as short sale volumes on every other
trading day during this two-week period were averaged and
compared with the daily returns and short sale volumes on the Event
Day. The sample surprises were comparable to those in the previous
three years in the mean, median and standard deviation, although
they were more negatively skewed. The Wilcoxon Rank Sum Test did
not reject the null hypothesis that sample surprises had a similar
distribution to those of historical events. Event Day returns appeared
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to be lower than Nonevent Day returns according to the mean,
median, and skewness numbers, while Event Day short sale volumes
appeared to be higher. These visual impressions were confirmed by
the Wilcoxon Rank Sum Test and the histograms shown in Figure 1.
FIGURE 1:
804










I I I II
-0.4 -0.32 -0.24 -0.16 -0.08
RETURN (DAILY)
0 0.08 0.16
These numbers and figures confirmed the representativeness
of the sample events for negative earnings shocks typically seen in
the recent history and the presence of stress on the Event Day. As
shown in the sections to follow, this study did not reveal any
restrictive effect of the uptick rule on intraday price movements and
short selling activities. This finding was not attributed to any
abnormal "mildness" of the surprise magnitudes of the sample events
compared to those typical of recent history or any inertia in the stock
market after receiving the negative earnings shocks.
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SECTION 5. OVERNIGHT AND INTRADAY PRICE EFFECT OF THE UPTICK
RULE
Since earnings announcements occurred either before or after
regular trading hours in the sample events, this study began a
comparison of the price adjustment process by examining overnight
returns of pilot and nonpilot stocks. It was possible that earnings
shocks were fully absorbed in open prices and thus not reflected in
price movements during regular trading hours. The following
paragraphs will first discuss briefly how open prices are set at NYSE,
AMEX, NASDAQ and regional exchanges, and then show the
comparison results of pilot and nonpilot stocks open prices.
5.1. Overnight Trading and Market Open System ofNYSE,
AMEX, NASDAQ, and Regional Exchanges
With the exception of Archipelago Exchange whose regular
trading hours were from 4:00a.m. to 8:00p.m. EST, regular trading
hours of exchanges to which the uptick rule applied started from
9:30a.m. to 4:00p.m. EST. Most exchanges had after hour crossing
sessions but they lasted no later than 6:30p.m. 25 There were no
overnight trading programs sponsored by any of the exchanges from
8:00p.m. to 4:00a.m. the next day. In addition to exchange-sponsored
after-hour crossing sessions, Electronic Communication Networks
("ECN") were also major venues for after-hour trading. Their
operation hours varied but typically did not extend beyond 8p.m.
25 Both the NYSE and AMEX provide crossing sessions in which matching buy
and sell orders can be executed at 5:00 p.m. at the exchanges' 4:00 p.m. closing
prices. In addition, four regional exchanges had post-primary trading sessions: the
Boston Stock Exchange and the Philadelphia Stock Exchange had post-primary
sessions that operate from 4:00 p.m. to 4:15 p.m.; the Chicago Stock Exchange
("CHXY) operated their post-primary sessions until 4:30 p.m. Since October 29,
1999, the CHX had also operated an "E-Session" to handle limit orders from 4:30
p.m. to 6:30 p.m.
[VOL. 5:1
HeinOnline -- 5 Rutgers Bus. L.J.  18 2008
2008] UPTICKRULE OF SHORTSALE PRICE REGULATION 19
EST. 26  After-hour trading could be influenced by earnings
information released after market close at 4:00p.m. EST.
Among the three categories of pilot stocks, Category A pilot
stocks were never subject to the uptick rule. Category B pilot stocks
were exempt from the uptick rule from 4:15p.m. to the time the
consolidated tapes opened
the next day. All other stocks belonged to Category C and were
exempt from the uptick rule from the time the consolidated tape was
closed to the time the tape opened the next day. Since April 2005, the
consolidated tape has opened at 4:00a.m. and closed at 8:00p.m.
The stocks in the sample were either listed on NYSE or AMEX,
or traded at NASDAQ NNM. At NYSE and AMEX, limit and market
orders to be executed at the open were submitted to the specialist
overnight, who determined the opening price. If the market-clearing
price determined by customer orders was close to the previous day's
close, the specialist had the option of not participating in the opening
batch auction. In this case, the market-clearing price was the opening
price. If the market-clearing price was not near the previous day's
close, then the specialist's obligation to maintain a fair and orderly
market required the specialist to participate in the batch auction and
mitigate the price change by either buying to increase the price, or
selling to decrease the price. If the market-clearing price was far
from the previous day's close, the specialist could request a floor
governor to deem the obligation to maintain a small price change too
onerous and delay the opening to give market participants a chance
to change their orders. The specialist would then post a potential
opening price range. New orders were then placed within the new
26 A short list of typical brokers that offer ECN access and the extended hours
available is listed below. This list is meant to be illustrative, not exhaustive.
Ameritrade (via Island ECN): Hours: 8:00 a.m.-8:00 p.m. EST; limit orders only
during extended hours. E*Trade (via Archipelago ECN): Hours: 8:00 a.m. -8:00 p.m.
EST; limit orders only during extended hours. Fidelity (via Redibook): Hours: 7:30-
9:15 a.m. and 4:15-8:00 p.m. EST; restrictions on order types. Harris Direct (via
Redibook ECN): Hours: 8:00-9:15 a.m. and 4:15-7:00 p.m. EST; limit orders only;
round lots. Schwab (via Redibook ECN): Hours: 7:30-9:15 a.m. and 4:15-8:00 p.m.
EST., Monday - Friday; limit orders only.
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price range. If the new clearing price was outside the posted range,
the process was repeated with a new posted price range until the
specialist found a market-clearing price. In addition to delays caused
by an order imbalance, NYSE trading could be delayed in the face of
a specific news release, initiated either by the company, which
informed the exchange of the news release, or by the exchange itself
in anticipation of news from another source. The uptick rule also
played a role at market open in the sense that short sale orders for
execution at market open price could not be executed at the open
price if the open price was a down tick from the previous day's close
price. Regional exchanges that trade NYSE or AMEX listed stocks
typically set the open prices equal to the open prices of the primary
exchanges.
The NASDAQ NNM regular trading session started at
9:30a.m., but pre-market trading started at 7:30a.m. Starting from
April 2005, there were three sessions of NASDAQ pre-market
trading: (1) the quote/order entry session from 7:30a.m. to 8:00a.m.
EST, during which time quotes could be updated, opened and
broadcasted, but no automatic execution could occur; (2) 8:00a.m. to
9:25a.m. EST, during which time automatic execution could occur,
but volume was typically negligible; and (3) 9:25-9:30a.m., during
which time NASDAQ opened and entered quotes for any participant
with no open interest. In the second session, market makers
transmitted their bid-ask quotes, observed other dealers' quotes and
identity, and revised their own quotes in response to the quotes of
others. Pre-opening quotes differed from quotes in regular trading
hours in that they were nonbinding, while dealers were required to
honor their quotes for the minimum quantity of up to 1,000 shares
during regular trading hours. In addition, market makers were
under no obligation to quote during the pre-opening period but were
required to provide two-way quotes during regular trading hours. In
session 3, if the firm chose to zero out its quotes overnight, NASDAQ
would enter a quote for the participant of $.01 bid and $2000 ask. If
the firm chose not to zero out its quotes overnight, NASDAQ would
enter a quote based on the last update by the firm. At 9:30 a.m.,
NASDAQ market makers began entering trades into the system.
Individual market makers were expected to report transactions in
[VOL. 5:1
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chronological sequence within 90 seconds of execution. These
conditions prevailed throughout the trading day. NASDAQ
implemented an Opening Cross in late 2004 to provide execution
opportunities to on-open orders. Starting from 7:30a.m., NASDAQ
systems began to accept such orders. At around 9:28a.m., NASDAQ
systems began disseminating information about order imbalance in
the opening book along with an indicative opening price. Opening
Cross occurred at 9:30a.m. when the opening book and the NASDAQ
Market Center continuous book were brought together to create a
single NASDAQ opening cross. Following the cross, regular market
hours trading proceeded as usual.
5.2. Compaison of Overnight Returns
Overnight returns were calculated as ln(P open)-n(P 1,clo,,
where Popen was the price at 9:30a.m. when the regular trading
sessions of the primary exchanges began on the Event Day, and
Pt ,'c1oe was the market close price at 4:00p.m. on the day before the
Event Day. Summary statistics of overnight returns are reported in
Table 2.
Table 2 Sumnaly Stistics of Ovenuoit Retiuis
Mean Median Maxinum Minimum Stdev Skewness
Pilot -0.04 -0.02 0 -0.30 0.05 -2.37
Ngornpiot -0.04 -0.02 0 -0.54 0.06 -3.39
Pilot and nonpilot stocks had comparable mean and median
overnight returns, but nonpilot stocks were slightly more negatively
skewed. Their identical maximum value of '0' was due to the
restriction of sample selection to events with nonpositive overnight
returns. The standard deviations of the two groups of stocks were
similar. Figure 2 shows the histograms of the overnight returns after
adjusting for overnight market returns. The summary statistics and
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the histogram do not suggest any difference in the overnight returns
of the two groups of stocks.
FIGURE 2: DISTRIBUTION OF OVERNIGHT RETURN-PILOT V.
NONPILOT
-0.54 -0.46 -0.38 -0.3 -0.22 -0.14
RETURN (OVERNIGHT)
-0.06 0.02
For each stock in the sample, a cross-sectional regression of
the overnight return (after adjusting for overnight market return)
was run on: 1) a pilot dummy; 2) earnings surprise; 3) an interaction
term of pilot and surprise; 4) a dummy variable for NASDAQ stocks;
5) an interaction term of the pilot dummy and the NASDAQ dummy;
and 6) firm market capitalization and 7) firm market-to-book ratio.
The NASDAQ dummy variable was intended to capture any
difference of NASDAQ stocks from NYSE and AMEX stocks because,
as a prior study has shown, the NASDAQ bid test under NASD Rule
3350 was less restrictive than Rule 10a-1 that applied to NYSE and
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AMEX stocks. Moreover, NASDAQ stocks traded outside NASDAQ
NNM were typically exempted from the bid test.27
The overnight return on the Russell 3000 iShare ETF was
used to proxy for overnight market returns. This ETF tracked the
performance of Russell 3000 index and its liquidity level was
reasonably high compared to other Russell 3000 ETFs. Regression
results are reported in Table 3. 28
27 See, e.g., American Stock Exchange Rule 7.02. This Rule exempted short sales
of NASDAQ stocks from the bid test. American Stock Exchange Rule 7 provided
"[n]o member or member organization shall for his or its own account or for the
account of any other person effect on the Exchange any short sale of a security
admitted to dealings on the Exchange unless such sale is based upon a sale in the
unit of trading (1) at a price higher than the price at which the latest sale thereof,
regular way, was effected on the Exchange, or (2) at such latest price and such
price is above the latest different price at which a sale in the unit of trading of such
security, regular way, was effected on the Exchange; provided, however, that
transactions exempted or excepted by paragraph (e) or paragraph (f) of Rule 10a- 1
or by Regulation SHO and any orders issued by the SEC pursuant to Regulation
SHO, each under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, are also exempted or
excepted, as the case may be, from this Rule 7." Id However, Rule 7.02 explicitly
exempted short sales in NASDAQ stocks by providing that "[t]his Rule [] does not
apply to transactions on the Exchange in NASDAQ securities effected under
Exchange Rule 118." Id.
28 In this table, "Ri t" was the excess return of stock i over the market return
from market close on the day before the Event Day to market open on the Event
Day. Overnight return of stock i was calculated as ln(Pt,open) - ln(Pt-li.os), and
overnight return of the market was proxied by the overnight return of the iShare
Russell 3000 ETF. "Pilot" was a dummy variable that took the value of 1 if the
stock was a pilot stock and 0 otherwise. "Srps" was earnings surprise calculated as
(actual EPS - median analyst forecast)/(price as of end of the fiscal quarter).
"Pilot*Srps" was an interaction term of "Pilot" and "Srps". "NNM" was a dummy
variable that took the value of 1 if the stock was listed on NASDAQ and 0
otherwise. "Pilot*NNM" was an interaction term of "Pilot" and "NNM". "MC" was
the stock's market capitalization calculated as the close price on the day before the
Event Day multiplied by shares outstanding as of the end of 2004. "MtB" was the
stock's market-to-book ratio calculated as the close price on the day before the
Event Day divided by the stock's book value at the end of April 2005. T-statistics
are in parentheses.
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Table 3 Re Pioion of Ovenuight Exess Retauii
The regression of overniht excess return was based on the model-
-%=a+ 91 0 + 2ST'* + 900t *" P~ + 94N~ 'rL*+ O.'-g',j"*N j ',,V.+ gr lnMC) +~nME,
Intercept Pilot Srps Pil t*Srps NNM PilotIfIM MC MtB Adj. R
-0.08 -0.01 -0.01 -0.: -0.02 0.01 0.002 0.001 0.05
--2.82 (-1.19) (4012) (4009) -5 )+ (1.14) (1.81) (0.67)
*Si cant at 5% level.
The coefficient on the pilot dummy was negative but
statistically insignificant with a t - statistics of -1. 19. Moreover, the
coefficient on the pilot dummy and surprise interaction term was
insignificant, suggesting that pilot stock returns were no different
from nonpiot stocks returns even when the magnitude of negative
surprises were high. NASDAQ stocks had lower overnight returns
compared to NYSE and AMEX stocks, but within the NASDAQ stock
group, there was no difference between pilot and nonpiot stocks.
For NYSE and AMEX stocks, the uptick rule applied to short
selling at market open prices. Thus, if the open price was lower than
the previous day's close price, short sale orders in nonpilot stocks
could not be executed while short sale orders in pilot stocks could. It
is interesting to note that this regulatory disparity did not cause any
difference in the open price.
5.3. Comparison ofIntraday Returns
For intraday returns, returns were calculated between
Designated Times on the Event Day defined as every 15 minute
interval from 9:30a.m. to 11:30a.m., and every 30 minute interval
from 11:30a.m. to 2:00p.m., and finally, every 60 minute interval
from 2:00p.m. to market close at 4:00p.m. Price data were obtained
from the New York Stock Exchange Trade and Quote ("TAQ")
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database. 29 If the uptick rule was indeed slowing price decline at
times of stress, pilot stocks were expected to have lower returns
during most periods. Summary statistics for noncumulative intraday
returns are provided in Table 4.
The summary statistics suggest that pilot stocks actually had
higher, rather than the expected lower, mean and median returns
from 9:30a.m. to 10:45a.m. than nonpilot stocks. Afterwards, pilot
stocks had lower mean returns in 7 out of 10 periods, and lower
median returns in 3 out of 10 periods. Pilot stocks returns were
slightly more negatively skewed than nonpilot stocks in just about
half of the time periods. The standard deviations of pilot and nonpilot
stocks were comparable. These numbers do not suggest that
returns of pilot stocks were systematically lower than returns of
nonpilot stocks. 30
A cross-sectional regression of returns, after adjusting for
market returns, was run on a pilot dummy, earnings surprise, an
interaction term of pilot and surprise, positive net order flow during
the Designated Time period, negative net order flow, an interaction of
pilot stock and negative net order flow, the NASDAQ dummy, the
interaction of pilot stock and NASDAQ dummy, market
capitalization, market-to-book ratio, market-adjusted return in the
previous period, and historical volatility. Historical volatility was
calculated by taking the average of ]n(Priceh) -in (Price ) on April 1,
5, 13, 18, 21, and 29, 2005 for each Designated Time period. Price,,
was the highest price and Price, was the lowest price of each period.
April was the month immediately before the start of the Pilot
Program. The selection of the dates within this month for the purpose
of calculating historical volatility and later on historical liquidity was
arbitrary, but the selected dates covered each day of a week and the
29 The TAQ data are recorded by the New York Stock Exchange and cover
intraday transactions data (trade and quote) for all securities listed on the New
York Stock Exchange, NASDAQ and regional exchanges. The database is the
primary source of historical trade and quote data for US equities.
30 Summary statistics for intraday returns calculated on a cumulative basis since
market open on the Event Day were consistent with Table 4. They will be provided
upon request.
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beginning, middle and end of the month. Net order flow was defined
BI-SI
as BI+ SI where BI was buyer-initiated trade volumes and SI was
seller-initiated trade volumes. Whether an order was buyer or seller
initiated was determined by the Lee and Ready31 algorithm, i.e., a
trade was buyer initiated if price > midquote and seller initiated if
price < midquote. Trades with price = midquote could be initiated
by either the buyer or the seller and thus were not included in the
calculation of order imbalance. Since the uptick rule might have
caused some seller-initiated market short orders to be converted into
limit orders at the legally shortable prices, these trades would appear
to be buyer-initiated under the above algorithm when indeed they
were initiated by short sellers. Thus, short sale orders were excluded
from the calculation of order imbalance. Regression results are
consistent with the summary statistics and are reported in Table 5.32
31 Charles Lee & Mark J. Ready, Inferring Trade Direction from Intraday Data, 46
J. FIN. 733, 733-46 (1991). Since trade data provides only the execution price and
volume of a particular trade and does not offer any information on whether the trade
was initiated by buy orders or sell orders, this algorithm is widely used by
researchers to infer direction of the trade.
32 See supra note 28 (defining "Pilot", "Srps", "Pilot*Srps", "NNM", "Pilot*NNM",
"MC", "MtB" in the table). In addition, in this table, "Rit" was the excess return of
stock i over the market return during periods between each Designated Time on the
Event Day, "OIP" and "O1 " were the net positive order flow and net negative order
flow, respectively. "HVol" was the stock's historical volatility calculated by taking the
average of ln(Priceh) - ln(Pricei) on April 1, 5, 13, 18, 21, and 29, 2005 for each
Designated Time period, where Priceh was the highest price and Pricei was the lowest
price of the time period. "Ri,1-" was the stock's return immediately before the current
period t. For the interval of 9:30 - 9:45 a.m., "Rijt-" was the stock's overnight return.
t-statistics are in parentheses.
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Table 5 hIntaday Excess Retim Regiession
The regression of intraday excess retun was based an the model
In+ teret + iSrps PloM s + O+ Prps. + OI M 4 Pa ot* M MC MtB THoA.
Intercept Pilot Srps Pilctrsips (I+ 01' Pilot*CI' NNM PiotNNM MC MtB R,,, J-ol Adj. R2
9:45 0.06 0.01 001 0.07 0.01 -0.001 -0.01 0.003
-2.76 (1.63) (003) (0.39) (301' (-0.14) (-0.62) (092)
1000 -0.03 0 005 -0.06 0.12 0.001 0001 0.004 0.003
-2.18 (234) (1.15) (1.93) (0.26) (0.31) (0.71) (149)
10:15 -0.001 -0.0002 003 -0.03 0.003 0003 -0.01 -0.001
(-01) (-013) (0 85) (-.75) (1.68) (1. 37) (-1.66) (-0.94)
10 30 -0.01 0002 -0.02 -0.01 0.002 0001 0.001 0.002
(-0.95) (1.58) (-0.55) (-0.23) (0.91) (0.70) (0.31) (2 .15)
1045 -0.02 0001 -0.01 0.03 0.005 -0.002 0.003 -0.002
- (C.85) (-0.27) (1.06) (2 91) (0.96) (1.32) (1.83)
o00 -0.004 0001 001 -0004 0.004 00003 0.001 -0.0002
(0.71) (1.01) (069) (016) (99'- (0.23) (0.50) (-0.29)
1115 -0.01 -000003 -. 03 0.04 0.004 0001 -00002 -0.001
(-1.13) (-003) (-1.4S) (1.38) 12 '- (0.9S) (-01) (-0.63)
1130 0.003 -0.0003 001 -0.03 0.0002 0001 0.003 -0.001
(0.63) (-0.33) (063) (-1.26) (0.13) (1.10) (1.77) (-0.68)
12 00 -0.01 -0.0002 -0.05 0.03 0.001 0001 0.002 0.001
(0.77) (0.14) (-1.5) (1.00) (0.64) (0.61) (0.69) (-0.91)
1230 -0.002 0.0001 -0.01 0.03 -0.0004 0001 0.002 0.001
(-0.3) (0.09) (442) (1.03) (025) (0.84) (0.88) (063)
13 00 00005 0001 001 -0.03 0.0005 -0.0001 -0001 0.0003
(0.10) (0.91) (041) (-1.33) (0.36) (-0.04) (-0.05) (042)
14:00 -0.004 0002 -0.06 0.01 -0.001 0003 -. 001 0.001
(-0.56) (1.31) (-2 03 (0.34) (-0.3) (1.32) (-0.3) (103)
1500 0.005 -0.0002 -0.02 -0.01 0.003 -0.003 0.003 0.001
(0.55) (0.15) (-0.54) (0.33) (1.13) (-1.21) (0.85) (0 60)
15:55 0.02 0.0003 -0.05 0.03 -0.002 0001 0.005 0.001
(1.94) (0.23) (15) (0.65) (069) (0.34) (1.21) (062)
16 00 0.001 -0.0003 002 0.00 0.001 00004 0.0002 -. 0002
(0.20) (-0.42) (128) (404) (1.47) (0.56) (0. 17) (-05)
* Significant at 5% level.
001 -0.02 -. 003 0.002 0.003 0.02
(I8) (-0.93) (-0.09) ( 21P (1.37)
-0.001 0.04 -0.14 0.001 -0.001 0.01
(029) (23) (123) (21)V (078)
0.002 0.07 -0.02 000004 -. 0003 0.01
(0.93) C Sj) (-0.35) (0.12) (-0 52)
-0.0002 -0.03 -0.08 0.0003 -0.001 0.01
(-0 12) (-1.12) (-1.15) (0.90) (-2 48)'W
0.004 0.05 -0.01 0.001 0.00002 0.04
(2 45)* (1.62) (-0.87) (3 56) (0.05)
-0.002 -0.02 003 0.0001 -0.0002 0.01
(-173) (O1 (085) (0.56) (059)
-0.001 0.12 006 0.0003 -0.001 0.03
(-0 66) i33 ;) (060) (1.18) (-145)
0.00004 0.04 -0.04 -0.001 0.0002 0.01
(0.04) (1.41) (-0.33) (-0.45) (0.65)
0.001 0.17 011 0.0002 -0.0001 0.01
(0.95) (3 84C (099) (0.62) (022)
0.001 0.06 0.09 0.0002 -0.0003 0001
(0.68) CII1)* (-0.9) (0.59) (-O7)
-0.002 0.03 -0.05 -0001 0.001 0002
(-136) (1.16) (405S) (-0.29) (25)*
-0.002 -0.14 -0.04 0.0001 0.0004 0.01
(-114) (322) (-0.4S) (0.42) (0.90)
0.001 0.07 -0.14 -0.0002 0.001 0003
(043) (1.84) (1.49) (-0.57) (119)
0.002 -0.04 -0.11 -0001 0.0003 0.01
(1.15) (-1.21) (- 1. 2 ) (-1.83) (-061)
0.0003 0.01 002 000001 -.00004 -0.002
(0.44) (0.39) (029) (0. 7) (-0 16)
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The coefficients on the pilot dummy were insignificant
throughout the Event Day except for the period of 9:45 - 10:00 am.
However, the sign of the coefficient for this period was positive,
indicating (and consistently with the summary statistics) that pilot
stocks actually had higher returns than nonpiot stocks during this
period. These numbers do not reveal any evidence that pilot stocks
with higher degrees of negative shocks had lower returns than their
nonpilot counterparts because the coefficients on the interaction term
of pilot and surprise were insignificant for all time periods. The
plotted histograms for each time period were visually consistent with
the above regression results. Due to limited space, they are not
included in this paper, but are available upon request. The
coefficients on the NASDAQ dummy, the pilot, and NASDAQ
interaction term were mostly insignificant, suggesting the lack of
difference between NASDAQ and NYSE/AMEX stocks and between
NASDAQ pilot and nonpilot stocks. The same regression was run
again but using cumulative intraday returns and produced results
highly consistent with those discussed above. Details of this
regression are available upon request.
5.4. Robustness Checks
Three robustness checks were performed on the intraday
return regression results discussed above. First, the sample was
further restricted to stocks with big increases in daily trading volume
from nonevent days because previous research had documented
strong positive correlation between high trading volumes and market
stress levels. Next, the sample was restricted to periods of high
negative net order flow as the imbalance toward stronger selling
interest was likely to produce consecutive down ticks that barred the
immediate execution of short sale orders. Finally, the existence of an
active put options market provided an alternative trading channel to
short sellers by allowing them to buy put options instead of shorting
stocks. Through arbitrage and hedging trades of options market
makers and other market professionals, the increased interest in put
options might eventually be transformed into short sales in the
underlying stocks but some of these trades were likely subject to the
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arbitrage exemptions and market maker exemptions granted by Rule
lOa-l(e) and NASD Rule 3350. 33 The effect of the uptick rule on
stocks without active options trading might be more acute. Therefore,
the sample was restricted to stocks without an active options market.
Corresponding to the first robustness check, sample stocks
were divided into ten groups according to the changes in their
trading volumes on the Event Day from their trading volumes on
nonevent days. Stocks belonging to the top three groups were
selected and this reduced sample maintained the pilot/nonpilot ratio
of 50%, which was similar to the ratio for the full sample and in line
with the SEC's design of the Pilot Program. There was no indication
that this reduced sample of high volume stocks were
disproportionally filled by pilot stocks. Corresponding to the second
robustness check, net order flow as defined in section 5.3 was
calculated for each Designated Time Period for every sample and the
entire sample was divided into ten groups according to the net order
flow value. The sample was then restricted to observations belonging
to the three groups with the biggest negative net order flow.
Corresponding to the third robustness check, the sample was reduced
to include stocks without an active options market. The regression
discussed in section 5.3 was run on each of these three reduced
samples and produced results highly consistent with the full sample
results discussed in the previous section. To conserve space, tables
recording these robustness check results are not included in this
paper but are available upon request.
5.5. Comparison of Time to Reach a Specitied Level of
Negative Return
To further examine whether prices of pilot stocks declined
faster than nonpilot stocks after receiving negative shocks, this study
specified a threshold level of negative intraday return and compared
the speed at which pilot and nonpilot stocks reached this level. First,
the lowest price for each sample stock on the Event Day was
33 NASDAQ Rule 3350, supra note 6.
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identified. There were about 120 observations with the minimum
intraday cumulative returns lower than 10% at some time on the
Event Day, about 210 observations with the minimum intraday
returns between -5% and -10%, and about 150 observations with the
minimum intraday returns between -3% and -5%. The remaining 450
observations had the minimum intraday returns higher than -3%.
This study arbitrarily picked -3% as the threshold level for the
purpose of comparing the speed of price decline because this level
produced enough observations (more than 480) and was a big enough
level of decline to suggest the existence of a downward price pressure.
The characteristics of the stocks in the remaining sample are
reported in Table 6.
The ratio of pilot to nonpilot stocks in the remaining sample
was 144/340, roughly in line with the ratio of the SEC's design of the
Pilot Program. The average level of the lowest point in the intraday
cumulative return was -.08 for pilot stocks, slightly higher than -.09
for nonpilot stocks. The median time that pilot stocks took to reach
their minimum intraday prices was ninety seven minutes, about forty
minutes shorter than that for nonpilot stocks. Again, pilot stocks in
the remaining sample had bigger market capitalizations, but the
market-to-book ratio, volatility and earnings surprises were
comparable for both groups of stocks. Historical volatility was
calculated by taking the average of the daily volatility (proxied by the
difference in the log of highest price and the log of lowest price) on
April 1, 5, 13, 18, 21, and 29, 2005.
HeinOnline -- 5 Rutgers Bus. L.J.  31 2008
32 R UTGERS B USINESS LA W JO URNAL [VOL. 5:1
Table 6 Comparison of Plot and Nonpflot Stocks wth Hfimun Intraday Retunis lower than or
Equal to -3%




Average Mnimurn Cumulafive Return
-Plot -0.04 -0.08
-Nonpiot -0.05 -0.09
Median Time to Reach Minimum Pnce
- Pilot 37 mm 97 mm
-Nonpiot 65 rm 140 rm
Median Surprse
- Pilot -0.002 -0.002
- NonpiLot -0.002 -0.002
Median Market Capitalzation
-Pot $764 ril $660 mA







For each stock in the remaining sample, this study identified
the point in time when the cumulative intraday return was closest to
the pre-specified level of -0.03. This time was regressed on a pilot
dummy, earnings surprise, the market return (proxied by the returns
on Russell 3000 iShares ETF), the stock's market capitalization,
market-to-book ratio, historical volatility, and historical liquidity
(proxied by the average ratio of the daily trading volume on April 1,
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5, 13, 18, 21, and 29 to the stock's shares outstanding). The
regression results are reported in Table 7.34 The insignificant
t-statistics on the pilot dummy indicated a lack of difference in the
time to reach -0.03 intraday return between pilot and nonpilot stocks,
confirming the previous finding that the prices of pilot stocks did not
decline faster than nonpilot stocks after negative earnings shocks.
Table ' Repression of Tune to Reach -003 Junaday Cmlidatwe Retau
This table presents the result of regression:
ln(lDme) = Cz+ Aloti + s+ /Flot* Srp s + * 4rp + + /3 + ft 6 V + +9 ln(MC), + f ln(MB)i + Fj
Intercept Pilot Srps Pilot*Srps R I-IVl Liq MC MtB Adj. R2
Estimate 3.94 0.03 11.45 -13.96 -68.54 -0.98 -3.55 0.19 -0.09 0.04
t-statistics (3.52) (0.16) (1.50) (-1 3) -388) t  (-0 96) (-0.51) 5) (-0.9)
*Signific ant at 5% level.
In sum, this study found no evidence that the uptick rule
provided support to stock prices after negative earnings shocks.
Since the hypothesis that the uptick rule impedes price decline builds
on the belief that the rule reduces short sale volume by prohibiting
execution of short sale orders at minus or zero minus ticks, this study
next examined whether the pilot stocks had a higher short sale
volume than nonpiot stocks at market open and Designated Times
on the Event Day.
34 See supra note 28 (defining "Pilot", "Srps", "Pilot*Srps", "NNM", "Pilot*NNM",
"MC", "MtB" in the table) and note 34 (defining "HVol"). In addition, in this table,
"Rm" stands for market return, and "Liq" was the average of daily trade volume
divided by shares outstanding for the same 6 days in April of 2005. t-statistics are
in parentheses.
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SECTION 6. COMPARISON OF SHORT SALE VOLUMES
Per request of the SEC at the beginning of the Pilot Program,
each stock exchange made tick by tick short sale data available to the
public. With the exception of the NASD's Alternative Display
Facility, which recorded short sales executed at the NASDAQ NNM
for a limited number of stocks, each exchange recorded only short
sales that were executed on that particular exchange. Short sale data
from each exchange were combined and a time series of executed
short sales for each stock in the sample was constructed for the
period of May 2 to November 30, 2005. To examine changes in short
sale volumes on the event day from non-event days, this study also
obtained short sale volumes for every other trading day during a two-
week period starting from three weeks before the event day. The
average of short sale volumes on non-event days for each time
interval examined was subtracted from the event day short sale
volumes. The difference was then divided by the stock's non-event
day average. 35 The study examined how changes in short sale
volumes, calculated both on a noncumulative basis for each time
period between Designated Times and on a cumulative basis since
market open, were related to the pilot or nonpilot status of the stock.
6.1. Comparison ofShort Sale Volumes at Market Open
Summary statistics of change in short sale volumes at market
open are reported in Table 8. They show that pilot stocks had a
higher mean and median short sale volume at market open.
35 The difference was also scaled by the stock's shares outstanding and by total
trading volumes, respectively, and the change in this ratio was calculated for each
sample stock from its historical level. Each regression discussed in this section was
repeated using the change in this ratio as the dependant variable. The results were
consistent with those reported in this section.
[VOL. 5:1
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Table 3 Smn[1(i Staitihc of Ch-iange in Open Shovt Vollune
Mean Median vaximurnm Ml um Stdev Skewness
Pilot 3.90 0.84 87.95 -I.00 8.48 4.70
Nonpoilt 3.83 0.09 98.66 -1.00 11.12 4.75
Table 936 reports the results of a cross-sectional regression of
changes in open short sale volumes on a pilot dummy, earnings
surprise and its interaction with pilot, a dummy for NASDAQ stocks
and its interaction with pilot, market return and firm characteristics.
A dummy variable for NASDAQ stocks was included because the
uptick rule applied to NYSE and AMEX stocks at market open by
referencing to the previous close price, but the NASD bid test did not
apply to NASDAQ stocks at market open. How the market open short
volumes differed between pilot and nonpilot stocks could depend on
where the stocks were traded.
The regression revealed a highly significant and positive
coefficient on the pilot dummy, a highly significant and positive
coefficient on NASDAQ dummy, and a highly significant but negative
coefficient on the interaction term of the pilot dummy and the
NASDAQ dummy. These results suggested that for NYSE and AMEX
stocks, pilot stocks had significantly higher open short volumes than
nonpilot stocks. This was hardly surprising because the uptick rule
applied to short sales at market open and our sample was restricted
to stocks with negative overnight returns.
36 See supra notes 28, 34 (defining the variables used in this regression).
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Table 9 Reiession of Change in Open Shoit Sale Vohunes
The regression of changes in open short volume was based on the model:
A&.q = a~~ +~ A A + SS + 3Rl .i- ,%z + 4W + ' Rio * MM + & P, + M1, ( i + 1, MB):' +,
Intercept Pilot Srps Pilot*Srps NNM Piot*NNIV R MC MtB Adj. R2
Market0 10.. 93 2.56 7.92 -1.9s 5.74 -5.17 107.0 -0.46 -0.29 0.06
(1.81) (;1 6 1) (0.31) (4006) (6 ) -,7* (0.96) (-1.60) (4064)
* Sigmdcant 5% level.
It is worth noting that the higher short sale volumes of pilot
stocks at market open did not cause specialists to set lower open
prices for pilot stocks, as evidenced by the lack of difference in
overnight returns between the two groups of stocks discussed earlier.
The higher market open short volumes for NASDAQ stocks relative
to NYSE and AMEX stocks were likely reflective of the
inapplicability of the bid test at market open. Within the group of
NASDAQ stocks, pilot stocks had lower short volumes at market
open. This was likely reflective of short sellers taking advantage of
the inapplicability of the bid test at market open and placing short
sale orders before regular trading hours began. Despite the difference
between the open short volumes of pilot and nonpilot stocks, open
short sale volumes accounted for just a small fraction of total Event
Day short sale volumes-for NYSE and AMEX stocks, the ratio
averaged 2.4% for pilot stocks and 1.4% for nonpilot stocks; for
NASDAQ stocks, the ratio averaged 1.7% for pilot stocks and 2.5% for
nonpilot stocks. Thus, the difference at market open was unlikely to
have any significant impact on the pattern of short selling activities
during regular trading hours.
6.2. Comparison oflntraday Short Sale Volumes
This study compared intraday short sale volumes of pilot and
nonpilot stocks on both a noncumulative basis as well as a
cumulative basis. The results on cumulative short volumes were
[VOL. 5:1
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similar to those for noncumulative short volumes.37  Summary
statistics of noncumulative intraday short sale volumes for each
period between Designated Times are reported in Table 10. They
show that pilot stocks had a higher mean in nine out of fifteen time
periods, and a higher median in eleven out of fifteen periods, offering
some preliminary evidence that pilot stock short volumes might be
higher than short volumes of nonpilot stocks. This difference was not
necessarily associated with the regulatory disparity between pilot
and nonpilot stocks; rather, it could be attributed to a wide range of
economic factors such as: the size of the firm; the volatility level;
order imbalance in the market; and the location of the trade (e.g.,
NYSE as opposed to NASDAQ), among others.
Cross-sectional regressions of changes in noncumulative short
sale volumes were run for each time period between the Designated
Times on: 1) a pilot dummy; 2) earnings surprise; 3) interaction of
pilot and surprise; 4) positive net order flow; 5) negative net order
flow; 6) a NASDAQ dummy; 7) an interaction term of the NASDAQ
dummy and the pilot dummy; 8) market return; 9) a firm's market
capitalization; 10) market-to-book ratio, lag1 change in short sale
volumes (except for the first time period of 9:30 - 9:45), lag1 return;
and 11) historical volatility. For the time period of 9:30 - 9:45, the
overnight returns were used for lag1 returns. The results are
reported in Table 11.38 The coefficients on the pilot dummy were
insignificant for each of the fifteen time periods. The coefficients on
the interaction term of pilot and surprise were significant in one
period but its sign was positive, suggesting again that pilot stocks
with bigger negative earnings shocks had lower (rather than the
expected higher) short sale volumes. Periods of high order imbalance,
both positive and negative, were associated with lower short volumes,
but there was no difference between pilot and nonpilot stocks at such
37 To conserve space, results on cumulative short volumes are not included in
this study.
3S Soo supra notes 28, 34 (defining "Pilot", "Srps", "Pilot*Srps", "NNM", "OI+',
"01-", "MC", "MtB", and "Ri -l"). In addition, "Pilot*NNM" in this table is an
interaction term of "Pilot" and "NNM."
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times as indicated by the insignificant coefficients on the interaction
term of the pilot dummy and negative net order flow.
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The lack of difference in short sale volumes between pilot and
nonpilot stocks was surprising, given that the uptick rule was
designed to reduce short sale volumes by preventing execution of
short orders at down-ticks. This result might attribute to one or
more of the following factors: (1) the frequent occurrence of market
conditions when the rule was not binding, that is, the minimum
shortable price ("MSP") <= bid for market short sale orders and
MSP<= ask for limit short sale orders, which allowed short selling at
the prevailing quotes without violating the rule; (2) the concentration
of short sale orders to limited windows of opportunities when the
uptick rule was not binding; (3) the exemptions to the rule, that is,
short sale orders were mostly placed by market professionals or
arbitrageurs who were exempt from the rule; (4) the provision of
price improvements by specialists to short orders up to the MSP so
that they could be executed without violating the rule; and (5)
existence of sufficient buy interest to provide execution opportunities
to short orders that had been converted to limit orders at the MSP.
The following subsections are dedicated to analyzing these scenarios
by examining short volumes occurring at different relations among
the bid, the ask, the MSP, and the execution price.
6.3. Did Upticks or Zero-plus Ticks Occur Frequently
Enough to Make the Uptick Rule Inapplicable Most of
the Time?
To answer this question, the TAQ Consolidated Quote data
was merged with the TAQ Consolidated Trade data in time sequence,
and the MSP required by the uptick rule at each point in time was
calculated and compared with the prevailing bid. The time during
which the MSP was lower than or equal to the best bid was
categorized as "non-binding" and was aggregated for each Designated
Time period on the Event Day. Then the ratio of the aggregated non-
binding times (in seconds) to the total number of seconds for each
Designated Time period was calculated. In doing so, the NYSE and
AMEX listed stocks were separated from NASDAQ stocks because, as
discussed in earlier sections, they were subject to different short sale
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rules and there was a disparate application of the short sale rule on
NASDAQ stocks by different exchanges. 39
Summary statistics on the non-binding time ratio for NYSE
and AMEX stocks are reported in Table 12 Panel A. They show that
non-binding times accounted for only about 8-12% of the Event Day
for nonpilot stocks. Moreover, the ratio for nonpilot stocks was lower
than the ratio for pilot stocks (averaged at about 8-14%). These
numbers do not support the hypothesis that unrestrictive execution
opportunities occurred with high frequency to render the uptick rule
inapplicable for most of the time. In contrast to NYSE and AMEX
stocks, the non-binding time ratios for NASDAQ stocks, which are
reported in Table 12 Panel B, accounted for 50-60% of the time.
3 See AMEX Rule 7, supra note 27 and accompanying text.
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To see whether this difference was caused by economic
conditions in the market or by the artificial difference in the short
sale rules that applied to the two groups of stocks differently, the
mean and median nonbinding time ratios of NYSE-AMEX stocks
were re-calculated using NASDAQ's bid test. The results, which are
reported in Table 12 Panel C, showed comparable ratios to those of
NASDAQ stocks and the t test confirmed the indifference throughout
the Event Day except for the period of 14:00 - 15:00. The increased
restrictiveness of NYSE and AMEX rules relative to the NASDAQ
rules could be illustrated with the following data. On November 2,
2005, at 9:52:24 a.m., stock AEL's best bid moved from 11.51 to
11.55. Under the NASDAQ's bid test, this increase in bid would
permit short selling at any price. However, under Rule 10a-1, we
would have to examine whether the previous trade occurred at a
down tick. The previous trade occurred at 9:52:19 a.m. at the price of
$11.63, which was a down tick compared to the earlier trade at
$11.65. Thus, under Rule 10a-1, short sellers could only trade at
$11.64 or higher. Since this price was higher than the prevailing best
bid, market short orders could not be executed immediately.
In sum, the nonbinding time ratios for NYSE and AMEX
stocks were too low to explain the lack of difference between the short
volumes of pilot and nonpilot stocks. The ratios for NASDAQ stocks
were much higher and could potentially explain the lack of difference
between pilot and nonpilot stocks.
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6.4. Were Short Sellers Timing the Market to Concentrate
Orders to Times When the Uptick Rule was
Nonbinding?
To answer this question and the questions in the following
paragraphs, this study took the approach of analyzing the relation
among the MSP, the prevailing bid and ask, and the execution price
when short sales occurred. The relation between the MSP and the
quotes would reveal whether short sales occurred at times when the
uptick rule was binding, the relation between the prices, and the
quotes would reveal whether the trades involving short sales were
initiated by sellers or buyers. Following the Lee and Ready
algorithm, 40 trades with price < midquote as were regarded as seller
initiated and trades with price> midquote were regarded as buyer
initiated. The relation between the MSP and execution prices would
reveal whether the short sales were exempt from the uptick rule,
either under the Pilot Program or any of the exemptions listed in
Rule 10a-1(e) and NASD Rule 3350. The different combinations of the
above elements resulted in 45 execution scenarios listed in Table 13.
For each stock in the sample and for each Designated Time
period on the Event Day, the short sale volumes in each scenario and
their weight in the total short sale volumes were calculated. This
weight was then averaged across pilot stocks and nonpilot stocks,
respectively. Since the weight exhibited no big variation across
different Designated Time periods for any scenario, an average was
also taken across different Designated Time periods to obtain a single
weight number for each execution scenario provided in Table 13.
40 Lee & Ready, supra note 31.
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Table 14 Shoir Sales at Noiuesticive Times
NYSE-AMEX Stocks





























































































































Total 32.05% 66.70% 61.99% 66.31%
* Sgic ant at 5% level.
Table 14 compares pilot and nonpilot stocks in terms of the
short volumes at times when the uptick rule was not binding, i.e.,
MSP <bid for seller-initiated short sales and MSP < ask for buyer-
initiated short sales. For NYSE and AMEX stocks, about 32% and
67% of short volume for pilot stocks occurred at such times,
respectively. The scenario bid < MSP = short price = ask accounted
for 38.96% of the total short volume for nonpilot stocks and most of
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the difference in the ratio between pilot and nonpilot stocks.
Arguably this scenario could be explained as short sellers entering
limit orders at the ask when it was equal to the MSP so that the
uptick rule would not bar execution. However, this hypothesis could
not explain why short sellers were less inclined to utilize
opportunities when MSP<ask as suggested by the low ratios for
scenarios MSP< bid < short price= ask and MSP= bid < short price= ask.
Jointly they accounted for only 10% of the total short volume. In
addition, scenarios MSP <short price < bid jointly accounted for only
11% of the total short volume. These scenarios captured short sales
initiated by the seller when the uptick rule was not binding. The big
difference between scenarios bid < MSP = short price = ask and
MSP < short price < bid could not plausibly be explained by short
sellers favoring limit orders to market orders. Alexander and
Peterson (1999) have shown that there were more market short
orders than limit short orders during its sample period of May
1996.41 The scenario bid < MSP = short price = ask was more likely
reflective of the story that market short orders whose immediate
execution were barred by the uptick rule were converted to limit
orders at the MSP, which in turn were matched with the upcoming
buy orders. Short sale volumes that could be explained by
concentration of short selling to nonbinding times accounted for at
most 2 5 % of the total short volumes.
For NASDAQ stocks, about 66% of the total short sale volumes
occurred at times when the bid test was not binding, 42 significantly
higher than the ratio for NYSE and AMEX stocks, but roughly in
proportion to the nonbinding time ratios shown in Table 12 Panel B.
Although differences between pilot and nonpilot stocks in some
scenarios were statistically significant, they were not economically
significant. The scenario bid < MSP = short price = ask accounted for
about 4% of total short sale volumes for both pilot and nonpilot
41 See Alexander & Peterson, supra note 18, at 90-116.
42 About 25% (24.5% for pilot stocks and 26.8% for nonpilot stocks) of total short
sale volumes occurred at times when the bid test was binding but without violating
the bid test due to price improvements at or above the MSP.
[VOL. 5:1
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stocks, in contrast to the striking difference between these two
groups for NYSE and AMEX stocks.
6.5. Could Exemptions Explain the Lack ofDifference in
Short Volumes Between Pilot and Nonpiot Stocks?
For NYSE and AMEX stocks, Rule 10a-1(e) provided numerous
exemptions from the uptick rule, mostly to market professionals and
arbitrageurs. 43 If short sale orders were mostly placed by traders
who were subject to exemptions, the suspension of the uptick rule on
pilot stocks naturally would not have any impact on short volumes
and returns. To examine whether this was the case, this study
compared pilot and nonpilot stocks in terms of short volumes at
prices lower than the MSP and thus in violation of the uptick rule.
The idea was that if most of the players in the short selling market
were subject to exemptions in the first place, there should not be any
significant increase in exempt short volumes after the uptick rule
was suspended. In other words, the exempted short volumes of pilot
stocks should not be significantly higher than those of nonpilot
stocks. The results are reported in Table 15.
Exempted short sales accounted for 49.81% of the total short
volumes for pilot stocks, 42.19% of which occurred at times when the
uptick rule was binding, i.e., when MSP > bid for seller-initiated
trades and MSP>askfor buyer-initiated trades. In comparison,
exempt short sales accounted for only 7 .7% of the total short sales for
nonpilot stocks, 6.46% of which occurred at times when the uptick
rule was binding. For pilot stocks, seller-initiated exempt short sales
accounted for about 3 0% of the total short volume, while buyer-
initiated accounted for only about 10% of the total short sales. For
nonpilot stocks, the volumes for seller-initiated short sales were
slightly lower than the volume for buyer-initiated short sales. The big
difference between pilot and nonpilot stocks in exempt short volumes
was not at all surprising, as it was the direct result of suspending the
uptick rule on pilot stocks. It also suggested that market
43 17 C.F.R. § 240; see also s upra, note 3 and accompanying text.
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professionals who benefited from the exemptions under Rule 10a-1(e)
were not the only players in the short selling market and thus
exemptions alone could not explain why the uptick rule did not make
any difference in the short sale volumes.
For NASDAQ stocks, short sales executed in violation of the
bid test accounted for 13.8% for pilot stocks and 7.04% for nonpilot
stocks. While the difference was economically significant, the number
was not nearly as dramatic as that for NYSE and AMEX stocks.
Since the bid test was nonbinding for about 60% of the times, and
these times absorbed about 60% of the total short volume, short
orders in pilot stocks whose executions relied on exemptions provided
by the Pilot Program were greatly reduced, and as a result, the
difference between pilot and nonpilot stocks listed on NASDAQ was
substantially reduced.
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Table 15 Companison of Shoit Sale Volmaes Violating tie Uphck Rile
Panel A
NYSE-AI X Stocks NASDAQ
Scenao Pilot NonpLot Pilot NonpLot
Seller-initiated, Price<=Bid 21.01% 1.35% 12.90% 6.31%
Buyer-initiated, Price>=Ask 7.88% 3.86% 0.00% 0.00%
Price Improvement, Bid<Price<Ask
Seller-initiated, Price<Midquote 9.71% 1.05% 0.30% 0.25%
Buyer-initiated, Price>Midquote 6.86% 0.83% 0.34% 0.48%
Price=Midquote 4.36% 0.60% 0.26% 0.00%































































depended on whether the trade was seller initiated or
buyer initiated Trade initiation could not be determined with accuracy when price was equal to the
midquote.
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6.6. Where Did Nonpiot Stocks Find Execution
Opportunities that "Neutralized" the Effect of the
Uptick Rule
For NYSE and AMEX stocks, the previous paragraphs have
shown that the uptick rule was limiting short sales at down ticks and
zero-minus ticks, but the overall short volumes for pilot and nonpilot
stocks remained the same. It is likely that nonpilot stocks found more
execution opportunities elsewhere that made up the difference
caused by the disparate application of the uptick rule. To examine
the source of execution opportunities for nonpilot stocks, this study
ranked the execution scenarios in which nonpilot stocks had higher
short volumes than pilot stocks. The results are reported in Table 16
Panel A.
Nonpilot stocks had higher short volumes than pilot stocks in
fourteen out of forty-five scenarios, among which scenario
bid < MSP = short price = ask ranked the highest with a striking
difference of 28.96%. This scenario alone offset 65% (28.96%/49.81%)
of the surplus short volumes of pilot stocks due to the suspension of
the uptick rule. As discussed earlier, this scenario was likely
reflective of the matching of market buy orders with short orders
which were initially placed as market orders but converted into limit
orders at the MSP when the uptick rule barred immediate execution.
Two observations could be made out of the higher ratio of
nonpilot stocks in this scenario. First, nonpilot stocks had more limit
orders piling at the MSP than pilot stocks. This was hardly
surprising because pilot stocks were not restricted by the uptick rule
so market short orders arriving at the trading floor when
bid < MSP could be executed immediately without being converted
into limit orders at the MSP.
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Table 16 Sceuanios uiwlchNonpilot Stoks Had Higher Shoit Volunes thaml pilot Stocks
Panel A NYSB and AiX Stocks
Scenario Weight Diff t -stat Cum. DiE
Bid<MSP-Short Price-Ask 1 28.96% (65.6)* 28.96%
-Pilot 10.01%
- Nonpilot 38.96%
MSP=Short Price=Bid 2 3.66% (15.56)- 32.62%
- Pilot 4.57%
- Nonpilot 8.24%
Bid<MSP=Short Price <Ask, Price<Miidquote 3 3.18% (12.2)* 35.80%
Pilot 3.56%
Nonpilot 6.74%
Bid<MSP=Short Price <Ask, Prce>Mdquote 4 2.36% (9.68)- 38.16%
Pilot 4.33%
Nonpilot 6.69%
Bid<MSP=Short Price <Ask, Price=Midquote 5 1.78% (8.94)* 39.94%
Pilot 2.81%
- Nonpilot 4.59%
Bid<MSP<Short Price=Ask 6 1.62% (5.71)- 41.56%
-Pilot 6.07%
- Nonpilot 7.69%
MSP=Eid<Short Price=Ask 7 0.80% (6.44)- 42.36%
Pilot 2.17%
Nonpilot 2.97%
Bid<Ask<MSP=Short Price 8 0.70% (6.00)* 43.06%
Pilot 0.72%
Nonpilot 1.43%
MSP=Short Price<Bid 9 0.57% (7.27)- 43.63%
Pilot 0.30%
- Nonpilot 0.87%
MSP<Bid<Short Price=Ask 10 0.23% (2.11)- 43.86%
-Pilot 0.81%
- Nonpilot 1.04%
MSP<Eid<Short Price<Ask, Price<Midquote 11 0.11% (1.17) 43.97%
Pilot 0.56%
Nonpilot 0.67%
MSP=Bid< Short Price <Ask, Puce<isdquote 12 0.02% (0.29) 43.99%
Pilot 0.93%
Nonpilot 0.96%
MSP-Bid<Short Price<Ask, Price>Midquote 13 0.01% (0.03) 44.00%
Pilot 0.79%
- Nonpilot 0.80%
MSP=Bid<Short Price<Ask, Price=Midquote 14 0.01% (0.19) 44.01%
-Pilot 0.47%
- Nonpilot 0.48%
* Signcant at 5% level.
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Second, most of the converted short orders were successfully
executed, rather than unfilled or cancelled, by matching buy orders
within fifteen minutes, which was the shortest time span that was
used in this intraday study - of their conversion.
Scenario 2, in which MSP = short price = bid, had the second
highest ranking with a difference of 3.66%. In this scenario, market
short sales were matched with a bid equal to the MSP. The higher
short volume of nonpilot stocks in this scenario suggested more
efficient utilization of the window of opportunities when the uptick
rule was nonbinding. Scenario 4, in
which bid < MSP= shortprice< ask with price> midquote, had a
difference of 2.36%. In this scenario, trades were more likely buyer-
initiated and "price improved" by a short sale order up to the MSP
level. It was again an indication that short sellers were more
efficiently utilizing opportunities when the uptick rule was
nonbinding.
Scenario 3, in which bid < MSP = short price < ask and
short price <midquote, had a difference of 3.18%. It was likely
initiated by market short sale orders but because bid < MSP, the
short sale could not be executed at the bid price. Instead of allowing
the order to convert to a limit order at the MSP level and waiting for
execution against future buy orders, a specialist or a floor broker
offered price improvement to the short sale order and allowed it to be
executed immediately. Scenario 5, in which
bid <MSP= short price < ask and short price =midquote, had a
difference of 1.78%. Trades in this scenario could either be seller-
initiated, and thus the same as scenario 3, or buyer initiated, and
thus the same as scenario 4. However, since the short price was at
the midquote, trade initiation could not be ascertained, and thus this
scenario was considered separately.
In sum, scenarios 1 through 5 had a cumulative difference of
39.94%, offsetting most of the surplus volumes of pilot stocks
attributed to the suspension of the uptick rule. These scenarios
represent three main sources of execution opportunities received by
short sellers in nonpilot stocks: (1) there was sufficient buy interest
matching with market short orders after their conversion into limit
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orders at the MSP; (2) short sellers subject to the uptick rule were
more efficiently utilizing the times when the uptick rule was not
binding to execute their trades; and (3) specialists or floor brokers
were providing price improvements to short sale orders up to the
MSP to allow for their immediate execution. The first factor was the
dominating factor among the three.
Two robustness checks were performed on the above findings.
First, the procedures were repeated on a sub-sample of observations
belonging to periods of the highest negative net order flow. 44 The
reason for this is that short sale orders, which were converted to limit
orders at the MSP, were facing a reduced chance of execution due to
a limited buy interest, but more sell orders were waiting for
execution. The restricted sample had approximately 700 observations
with a pilot/nonpilot ratio of 302 to 446, and a mean net order flow of
-0.76 for pilot stocks and -0.73 for nonpilot stocks. The procedures
reported in Tables 14, 15, and 16 Panel A were repeated and
produced results highly consistent with those discussed in this
section.
The second robustness check was based on a sub-sample of
pilot and nonpilot stocks, carefully paired in terms of market
capitalization, trade volume (scaled by shares outstanding) during
each Designated Time period, and short volume (scaled by trade
volume) during each Designated Time period. This procedure ranked
the observations for each stock in the full sample according to these
three criteria. There were ten ranks for each criterion. Observations
for pilot and nonpilot stocks that occurred in the same Designated
Time period and had the same rank in all three criteria were paired.
For example, during 14:00 - 15:00 on the Event Day, pilot stock A
had a trade volume rank of eight and a short sale volume rank of
nine. Nonpilot stock B also had a trade volume rank of eight and a
short sale volume rank of nine during the same time period. Both
stocks were large stocks with a market capitalization rank of nine.
These two observations formed a pair for the purpose of this
44 See supra, section 5.3 (discussing the methods in identifying periods of
negative net order flow).
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robustness check. There were 635 such pairs. Again, procedures
reported in Tables 14, 15, and 16 Panel A were repeated on this sub-
sample and produced results highly consistent with those discussed
above. 4
5
The story was completely different for NASDAQ stocks. As
shown in Table 16 Panel B, there was no dominating scenario that
made up the 7% difference in short sale volumes due to the
suspension of the bid best on pilot stocks. The biggest positive
difference between pilot and nonpilot stocks was 1.11%, given by
scenario Bid < MSP = Short Price = Ask, which was not significant in
the economic sense. In sum, the bid test was not binding on short
selling for 60% of the time, allowing for more than 60% of short sales
to take place during such periods without violating the uptick rule.
45 To conserve space, the results of these robustness checks are not reported in
this paper but are available upon request.
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Table 16 S enaiios in whivh Nonpilot Stok Had }figher Short Vohunes than Pilot Storks
Panel B NASDAQ Stocks
Scenario Weight Diff I -stat Cur Diff
Bid<MSP-Price-Ask 1
Pilot 3.58% 1.11% (3-57)' 1.11%
Nonpilot 4.70%
Bid<MSP-Pice<Ask, Price<Midquote 2
Pilot 4.85% 1.09% (3130 220%
Nonpilot 5.94%
MSP<Bid<Price=Ask 3
- Pilot 11.84% 1.04% (2.01) 3.24%
-Nonpilot 12.S7/
MSP<Bid<Price<Ask, Price <Midquote 4
Pilot 6.87% 0.99% (2.46)- 4.23%
Nonpilot 7.86%
MSP<Bid<Price<Ask, Price>hMidquote 5
Pilot 11.02% 0.95% (1.80) 5.18%
Nonpilot 11.97%
Bid<MSP<Price-Ask 6
Pilot 5.95% 0.82% (2,14)' 6.00%
Nonpilot 6.77%
Bid<MSP <Price <Ask, Price>Midquote 7
- Pilot 10.00% 0.73% (1.55) 6.73%
-Nonpilot 10.73%
Bid<MSP <Price <Ask, Price<Mdiquote 8
Pilot 5.21% 0.28% (0.82) 7.01%
- Nonpilot 5.49%
Price<Bid<MSP <Ask 9
Pilot 0.55% 0.28% (1.80) 7.29%
Nonpilot 0.83%
Bid<MSP=Price<Ask, Price>Midquote 10
Pilot 0.34% 0.23% (254)0 7.53%
Nonpilot 0.57%
MSP<Bid<Price<Ask, Price-Midquote 11
Pilot 2.33% 0.17% (0.90) 7.70%
Nonpilot 2.51%
Bid<Price<MSP-Ask, Price>hMidquote 12
Pilot 0.26% 0.13% (2,02) 7.83%
Nonpilot 0.39%
Bid<MSP-Price<Ask, Price-Midquote 13
Pilot 2.69% 0.02% (0.03) 7.85%
Nonpilot 2.70%
Price< MSP <Bid 14
Pilot 0.00% 0.01% (1.00) 7.86%
Nonpilot 0.01%
Bid<Price <MSP <Ask, Price>Midquote 15
Pilot 0.06% 0.03% 7.89%
- Nonpilot 0.09%
*Significant at 5% level.
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When the rule was binding, short sellers received price
improvements at or above the MSP level so that another 25% of short
sales occurred during such period without violating the rule. As a
result, only 13% of the short sales in pilot stocks relied on the
exemptions provided by the Pilot Program. This lead to a scant 7%
difference between short volumes of pilot and nonpilot stocks that
violated the bid test. This difference was made up in 15 scenarios in
which nonpilot stocks had higher short volumes, none of which were
economically dominating.
6.7. A Comment on the Effect of the Uptick Rule in the 1
Cent Minimum lfrk Move Environment
This study has shown that short sale orders subject to the
restrictions of the uptick rule were able to find execution
opportunities shortly after their conversion into limit orders at the
MSP. This result is consistent with the findings of Alexander and
Peterson (2002),46 which has shown that the reduction in the tick size
led to more frequent occurrences of the MSP being lower than the ask
and a reduction in the depth across the order book, and that both
factors made it easier for the execution of market short orders after
their conversion into limit orders. In the data sample used in this
study, the MSP was between the quotes for approximately 25% of the
times. During such times, market short orders that were converted
into limit orders at the MSP had priority in the execution queue
ahead of existing limit orders in the book. The MSP was equal to the
ask for approximately 30-35% of the times and higher than the ask
for approximately 4 0- 4 5 % of times in our sample. During such times,
existing limit orders in the book at the same price level or lower had
priority over the converted short sale orders at those times. If the
level of the MSP changed before converted short orders were
executed, the unexecuted orders would be deemed limit short orders
at the new MSP
46 Gordon J. Alexander & Mark A. Peterson, Implications ofa Reduction in Tick
Size on Short-Sell Order Execution, 11 J. FIN. INTERMED. 37, 37-60 (2002).
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level and take priority after existing limit orders in the book at the
same price level. Since the Pilot Program did not make the data on
initial order submissions available to the public, the actual time gap
between order submission and execution could not be determined.
However, the results of this study suggested the time gap was not
longer than 15 minutes.
SECTION 7. CONCLUSION
This study examined the effect of the short sale uptick rule on
the overnight and intraday price movements and short sale volumes.
It took advantage of the SEC pilot program that started on May 2,
2005, whereby one-third of Russell 3000 Index constituent stocks
were exempted from the uptick rule. The returns and short sale
volumes of these exempted stocks were compared to the returns and
short sale volumes of nonexempted stocks at market open and at
different times on the days immediately after negative earnings
surprises. The study found no evidence that the uptick rule had
reduced the speed of price decline on those days, nor any evidence
that the rule was limiting short sale volumes during regular trading
hours. By analyzing executed short volumes at different relations
among the minimum shortable price, the execution price, and the
prevailing quotes, the study found that the short sale uptick rule for
NYSE and AMEX stocks and the bid test for NASDAQ stocks were
not reducing short sale volumes for different reasons.
For NASDAQ stocks, up bids occurred about 60% of the time
and absorbed 61-66% of the short sale volumes for pilot and nonpilot
stocks. Price improvements, which allowed executions of short orders
at or above the legally shortable price levels when the bid test would
otherwise prevent execution of short orders at the bid, absorbed
another 25-27% of the total short volume. The availability of
execution opportunities through these two channels significantly
reduced the reliance on the exemption granted by the Pilot Program
and, as a result, the Pilot Program caused only a 7% of difference in
short sale volume between pilot stocks and nonpilot stocks. This
narrow difference was easily eliminated by price improvements and
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short sellers' increased utilization of limit orders at the ask to avoid
the restriction of the bid test.
For NYSE and AMEX stocks, neither the frequency of
occurrence of upticks or zero-plus ticks (which occurred for only 10-
12% of the times) nor exemptions to the uptick rule could explain
why the uptick rule was not reducing short sale volumes; rather,
market short orders whose immediate executions were barred by the
uptick rule were able to find execution opportunities from the
upcoming market buy orders shortly after their conversion into limit
orders at the legally shortable prices. There was also evidence of
more efficient utilization of execution opportunities when the uptick
rule was not binding and price improvements from specialists or floor
brokers up moved to the legally shortable prices. The results of this
study are consistent with the hypothesis that the reduction of
minimum tick movement to 1 cent has made it easier for short orders
to be executed by allowing the minimum shortable prices to be lower
than the best ask more often and reducing depth at each price level
across the order book. This study lends support to the viewpoint of
some market participants that the reduction in the minimum tick
size had made it difficult for the uptick rule to limit short selling
activities as originally intended by Congress.
In terms of regulatory significance, this study lends support,
albeit conditionally, to the SEC's recent decision to abolish the uptick
rule, the condition being the absence of extreme market conditions
that substantially exceed the typical pressure levels following
negative earnings news. During the period of the Pilot Program, few
US stocks experienced catastrophic shocks that resulted in
overwhelming negative order imbalances and plummeting stock
prices to just a fraction of their levels before the shocks. Researchers
were unable to evaluate the performance of the uptick rule in that
extreme negative environment. For this reason, the SEC's complete
abolishment rather than a selective application of the rule to extreme
market declines is beyond the scope of research results produced by
the Pilot Program. However, as stated in the SEC release, should a
market emergency occur, the SEC is equipped with a general power
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under Section 12(k)(2) 47 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 to
impose additional restrictions, including reviving the uptick rule, to
protect market integrity. How quickly the uptick rule could be
revitalized after a long period of idleness is beyond the scope of this
paper.
41 15 U.S.C. § 781-12(k)(2) (2008). This provision provides that the Commission, in an
emergency, may by order summarily take such action to alter, supplement, suspend, or impose
requirements or restrictions with respect to any matter or action subject to regulation by the
Commission or a self-regulatory organization under securities laws, as the Commission
determines is necessary in the public interest and for the protection of investors. -d.
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